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Background: Manufacturers justify the high prices for orphan drugs on the basis that the associated R&D costs
must be spread over few patients. The proliferation of these drugs in the last three decades, combined with high
prices commonly in excess of $100,000 per patient per year are placing a substantial strain on the budgets of drug
plans in many countries. Do insurers spend a growing portion of their budgets on small patient populations, or
leave vulnerable patients without coverage for valuable treatments? We suggest that a third option is present in
the form of a cost-based regulatory mechanism.
Methods: This article explores the use of a cost-based price control mechanism for orphan drugs, adapted from
the standard models applied in utilities regulation.
Results and conclusions: A rate-of-return style model, employing yardsticked cost allocations and a modified
two-stage rate of return calculation could be effective in setting a new standard for orphan drugs pricing. This type
of cost-based pricing would limit the costs faced by insurers while continuing to provide an efficient incentive for
new drug development.
Keywords: Price regulation, Orphan drugs, Rate of return, YardstickingBackground
Orphan drugs – those that treat small populations – are
placing a substantial strain on the budgets of drug
plans in many countries [1-4]. Prices commonly exceed
$100,000 per patient per year and are increasing [5].
While these drugs offer important therapeutic benefits,
prices are at a level that private and public insurers are
struggling to manage. In many cases, insurers are faced
with a deep quandary: how much are they willing to pay
to save or extend a life by a few months or years? The
reality of budget constraints for public insurance plans
limits the amount that can be spent on drugs, orphan or
not. The problem is likely to become more acute. Re-
search is increasingly leading to more refined disease
classifications so that potential and existing treatments
face shrinking patient numbers [6,7].* Correspondence: ahollis@ucalgary.ca
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumThe high cost of drug development, relative to total
market size, is often cited by pharmaceutical firms to
justify the high prices of orphan drugs. Firms argue that
drug development costs are similar no matter how rare
the disease or condition, but the number of patients
for orphan drugs is much smaller, necessitating a high
price for the firm to cover its costs. Current literature
indicates that production cost and molecular complexity
do not play a significant role in orphan drugs pricing;
pricing is more directly correlated to rarity (drugs with
a smaller patient group have higher costs) and “what
the market will bear” [8].
Despite high prices, insurers continue to display some
willingness to cover orphan drugs [1,9]. Given this pref-
erence and the fact that orphan drugs are associated
with high average costs, the question arises: is there an
effective policy to limit the prices faced by drug plans
while still providing sufficient incentive to pharmaceutical
companies to develop and market orphan drugs?
Without an effective standard on which to evaluate or-
phan drug prices, current policies are likely contributingntral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
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changes to the standard used to evaluate orphan drug
pricing have been proposed. Some are modifications of
the existing value-based or cost-effectiveness criteria
[10-12]. An important analysis by Hughes-Wilson et. al.
proposes an evaluation system that would depend on
multiple parameters, including rarity, the extent of
research undertaken, manufacturing complexity, and
disease severity [13]. Our analysis could be seen as an
input into a system such as the one they propose, or as
offering an alternative.
Cost-effectiveness measures relate the price of a drug
to a standardized measure of value, typically a QALY
(quality-adjusted life year). Insurers and regulatory author-
ities commonly employ the “incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio” to evaluate the price/coverage decision of new drugs
[14]. For a given budget, drugs are ranked according to
their cost effectiveness. Drugs with a cost-effectiveness
above a specific threshold are then insured. The thresh-
old is set to exhaust the given budget. Facing this
system, firms tend to price to the expected threshold,
and earn profits based on the differential between
the threshold price and their costs of providing the
product. Firms with the lowest costs of producing health
generally earn higher profits.
Cost-effectiveness measures favor “common” drugs
over orphan drugs due to the lower average cost of the
former [2]. Realizing this, health and policy officials
often make exceptions for orphan drugs; they may add a
rarity premium to the cost/benefit measure, or use some
other differential standard to justify the higher price of
an orphan drug. The current application of these some-
what ad hoc policies are problematic as they do not re-
place the standard cost-effectiveness measure with any
rule that helps to determine how much the insurer
should be willing to pay for a given drug [1].
Given the high prices being paid, orphan drug develop-
ment is becoming more profitable than development of
drugs for common diseases [3]. The orphan drug market
is currently growing faster than the market for traditional
pharmaceuticals: 25.8% vs. 20.1% for the period 2001 to
2010 in the United States [15].
This suggests that the appropriate context in which to
discuss orphan drug prices is to focus on a balance
between sufficient compensation to firms that develop
these drugs and control of the overall insurer budget
[2]. Cote and Keating [16] note that many “orphan” drugs
are financial blockbusters, and that the high prices justified
on the basis of low prevalence become a path to excessive
profits. Kanavos and Nicod [17] have proposed that it
would be important to have a “benchmark” to deter-
mine whether the profitability of some drugs has been
“excessive.” Our paper makes a start on establishing a
basis for creating a benchmark.Since firms cite higher average costs in justification
of higher orphan drugs prices, it seems natural that we
consider a cost-based pricing approach. Cost-based pricing
has not been seriously investigated as a pharmaceutical
pricing solution, yet there is a substantial volume of litera-
ture on cost-based pricing in utilities where the model is
widely employed [18]. The contribution of this paper is to
exploit the utilities regulation literature to provide insight
into the possibilities for cost-based regulation of orphan
drugs prices. Based on comparisons to the regulatory
mechanisms used in utilities sectors, we explore the
use of a regulatory cost-of-service model modified for
use by a government drug insurance plan. This could
be implemented as the formal adoption of a cost-based
approach in the price negotiation phase of approval.
Should an orphan drug fail the cost effectiveness test
(which is likely) we propose a cost-based mechanism
to determine a “just and reasonable price” for the drug
[19-21]. The prescribed approach is summarized by the
flowchart below (Figure 1).
The remainder of this paper is laid out as follows: Section
utilities as a model for orphan drugs: comparing cost
structures examines similarities in cost structure between
utilities and pharmaceutical firms as evidence that utilities
regulation can inform orphan drugs pricing decisions. Sec-
tion economic regulation: a primer with utilities case studies
gives an overview of the rationale for economic regulation
and describes two relevant models applied in utilities ju-
risdictions. Section drug price regulation details relevant
existing economic interventions in pharmaceutical markets.
Section rate of return model for orphan drug price regu-
lation exposits our prescription for a cost-based pricing
standard. Section conclusion, concludes.
Utilities as a model for orphan drugs: comparing
cost structures
Most utilities face a substantial “sunk” investment in the
form of facilities construction (for example an electrical
generation or pipeline facility). These costs are described
by economists as “sunk” since, once constructed, these
facilities have no alternative use and their value cannot
be easily recovered through resale of purchased assets
[22]. Most medical therapies share this characteristic
of a substantial sunk cost in the form of research and
development costs. Once R&D has occurred, the associated
costs are not recoverable. Drug development costs have
been estimated at between $207 million and $1.8 billion
[23]. By comparison, the Canadian National Energy Board
currently regulates pipelines with a range of established
capitalized costs between $394 million and $6.17 billion.
In addition to the high sunk costs, the marginal cost
of production (i.e. the cost to produce an incremental unit)
tends to be low in both industries. In utilities industries,
once a facility like a power-plant or pipeline has been
Submission to a drug plan
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Figure 1 Proposed drug plan decision tree.
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service provided are associated with very small (or no)
increases in cost. For a pipeline, as long as it is operating
below its maximum capacity, an additional cubic foot or
barrel of throughput does not have a substantive effect on
the total cost of providing the service. The same is true in
the production of drugs for rare diseases. Once a drug has
been developed and approved, the cost of producing an
additional unit is typically very small.
We can represent the average cost of production for
a unit of output in either the orphan drug or utilities





Given the high fixed cost estimates cited above and
the essentially negligible marginal cost for both drugs
and utilities, the cost functions of both industries exhibit
classic economies of scale. In both cases the average cost
of production is falling as the total quantity increases.
The addition of a second firm into such a market and the
associated doubling of fixed costs will increase the average
cost by splitting the same total quantity across twice the
fixed costs. This fits a basic definition of a natural monop-
oly: an industry in which a single firm can serve the entire
market at a lower cost than multiple firms [24].
In the pharmaceutical market it may be possible for
a second firm to enter at a lower average cost by free
riding on the incumbent’s research and development
expenditure [25]. While the possibility of free-riding
entrants may imply that pharmaceutical firms are
not necessarily ‘natural’ monopolies, patent protection
(or other protections of exclusivity, including data protection)
essentially give firms a government-granted monopoly[26]. The patent system has been set up with the express
purpose of creating incentives for innovation, and the
existence of patent laws creates an economic environment
similar to a natural monopoly industry. Even when multiple
drugs are approved for the same indication, the patent
system is still present to restrict free entry. In this limited
competition “oligopoly” type market, prices will continue
to remain high absent external regulations.
An important difference between utilities and pharma-
ceutical companies costs concerns the timing of sunk
expenditure. Historically, utilities incurred relatively little
capital cost prior to regulatory approval of a new facility. By
comparison, pharmaceutical firms must incur almost all of
their sunk costs prior to applying for regulatory approval.
This difference in the timing has implications for risk.
In utilities jurisdictions, the productivity of fixed/sunk
capital inputs (and associated expenditures) is relatively
deterministic. That is, a firm or regulator can have a rea-
sonable (and fairly accurate) expectation of how product-
ive a capital input will be. In the pharmaceutical industry,
fixed/sunk costs are generally associated with R&D ex-
penditures, which by their very nature have an uncer-
tain effect on revenue.
Economic regulation: a primer with utilities case studies
In competitive markets (where there are several firms
producing similar products), competition acts as a
constraint on the price charged by any single firm. If
one firm increases its price, consumers can switch to a
lower priced substitute provided by a competitor. However,
as discussed in the previous section most utilities and
orphan drugs manufacturers are monopoly (or oligopoly)
industries, in which a single firm (or a very small number
of firms) can supply the entire market at a lower total
cost than multiple (or a higher number of ) firms. The
introduction of an additional competing firm in a natural
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causing an increase in the market price and certainly re-
ducing economic efficiency as measured by the difference
between the total value of a product to consumers and its
cost of production [24].
The unfortunate consequence of this is that standard
competitive forces will not be present to limit the prices
charged by firms in natural monopoly industries. This is
why economic regulation is warranted and desirable.
The goals of a desirable price control mechanism are
twofold: i) to protect consumers from the market power
of firms arising from an absence of competition and ii)
to provide those firms with revenues sufficient to ensure
fair compensation.
We present here an overview of two common models
of economic regulation: yardstick and rate of return.
These mechanisms form the basis for a substantial majority
of existing economic regulation in the utilities and pharma-
ceutical sectors.
Yardstick regulation
Yardstick regulation is a comparative pricing mechanism.
In the traditional definition a regulator using this mechan-
ism sets a regulated price for a firm’s product based on the
costs incurred by similar firms producing the same good
[27]. In conventional application regulators may use either
the costs of similar firms, or observed prices in other juris-
dictions or comparable markets in order to determine the
‘fair’ price for a regulated good.
If there is a competitive industry on which to benchmark
prices, then yard-sticking is a proxy for direct competition.
Yardstick applications can also occur between two regu-
lated markets wherein a regulator, observing a regulated
price in another jurisdiction, will set the same price. This
has the potential for circularity in regulatory mechanisms
if two prices are benchmarked against each other, render-
ing the policy ineffective as a price control mechanism.
A key theoretical feature of yardstick regulation is the
preservation of incentives for firms to reduce costs.
Since the regulated price is not based on the firm’s own
costs, the firm can increase profits by reducing costs. In
pharmaceuticals, the yardstick approach is very widely
used, but faces a significant challenge because the reference
prices are often not the real prices paid, owing to the
common practice of confidential rebates [4].
Yardsticking is also present in utilities jurisdictions like
the electricity distribution sector. The Netherlands and
Sweden as well as Chile regulate electricity distribution
using a formal yardstick approach [28,29]. Italian water
utilities are also regulated using a strict application of the
original formulation [27] of the yardstick approach.
Conventional yardstick regulation is most common
where there are several firms either operating in the same
market, or operating in several similar markets where eachfirm has a regional monopoly. If there are very few firms
in the market, or if firms are sufficiently dissimilar, direct
application of the yardstick model becomes difficult or
impossible as a realistic yardstick for a given firm will be
difficult to identify [28].
Rate of return regulation
Under rate of return (ROR) regulation the price is set
such that it produces total revenues for the firm that
are equal to a fixed and predetermined amount referred to
as the “revenue requirement”. Application of ROR follows
a multi-stage process. First, regulators aggregate the value
of a firm’s assets into an account called the ‘rate base.’ The
regulator then estimates a ‘fair’ rate of return based on the
firm’s cost of capital. Often this is done using a formula in
which some risk adjustment is added to a standard measure
of borrowing costs (such as the long-term rate on govern-
ment bonds) [30]. Elements of yardsticking can be incorpo-
rated into the determination of the regulated rate of return;
regulated firms, their consumers and the regulator itself
commonly reference (or yardstick) rates of return in similar
unregulated industries.
The next step in ROR regulation is to add the product of
the rate base and the determined ‘fair’ rate of return to a
measure of the firm’s variable costs (consumable materials
like office supplies, advertising expenses or other intermedi-
ate input goods). A depreciation allowance is also added to
the total, producing a “revenue requirement” adequate
to compensate the firm for its costs and allow it to earn
a fair return on its investments. Price is then set to achieve
this revenue requirement.
Since the regulator is unlikely to have direct knowledge
of the firm’s costs, there is often disagreement as to the
costs included in the rate base. Determination of the firm’s
cost of capital is also contentious due to the abstract
nature of this value. The cost of capital can be described as
the minimum return that investors require for providing
capital; this is a value unobservable to anyone except the
investors themselves.
Regulated prices are typically set for a fixed period. At
the end of each period the regulator institutes a hearing to
review cost and price elements and makes adjustments
accordingly. This process usually follows a convention
wherein the regulated firm and its consumers and inter-
ested parties are given the opportunity to present evidence
on cost elements and the calculated rate of return.
Conventional application of the rate of return mechanism
in a utilities setting includes a “used and useful” criteria on
the allowable costs. Coupled with periodic regulatory
hearings in which the regulated firm must defend its
input decisions, the idea is to ensure that only relevant
and necessary costs be counted [31].
The next section provides an overview of two price con-
trol mechanisms employed in the pharmaceutical sector.
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Price regulation
Drug price regulation is most often exercised through
insurers’ limiting the amount they will pay for a given drug.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is essentially a form of price
regulation; however in many countries there are sup-
plementary rules about pricing. Such price regulation
frequently uses some comparative, or yardstick, mech-
anisms. Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands use
a direct yardstick method to evaluate orphan drug prices,
directly comparing domestic prices to those issued in
other countries [26]. In Canada, the Patented Medicine
Prices Review Board (PMPRB) uses two tools to set a
ceiling price. For new drugs offering a substantial im-
provement over existing therapies, the Canadian price
is not allowed to exceed the median price for the same drug
in seven other countries. This is only useful if the other
countries don’t use the same comparative mechanism, and
if the prices measured in those countries are real prices.
Comparative price setting is leading many companies to
set high nominal prices with hidden rebates so that
comparisons won’t limit pricing elsewhere. The PMPRB
uses a different tool for new drugs that offer little or no
therapeutic advantage: their price is limited to be no
higher than the price of comparable drugs [32].
While the price cap set under the PMPRB is compulsory,
this regulatory oversight is separate from the decisions
of drug plans (generally administered by the provincial
governments in Canada). As such, the PMPRB price cap
provides only limited price protection, with the majority of
price/coverage decisions dictated by the cost effectiveness
and ad hoc orphan drugs exceptions (discussed above)
made by provincial regulators/drug plans.
Rate of return and cost-yardstick regulation: U.K. PPRS
The use of ROR is uncommon in drug price regulation;
however the United Kingdom’s Pharmaceutical Price
Regulation Scheme (PPRS) has included a profit con-
trol scheme that bears some resemblance to a ROR
model. The PPRS profit control scheme is rarely bind-
ing due to the existence of a separate value-based price
cap (similar to that discussed above). Yet, despite its
redundancy, the PPRS profit control mechanism includes
some important features that distinguish it from the
conventional application of ROR to utilities.
The PPRS agreement for 2005 to 2009 outlined an upper
limit on pharmaceutical firm’s profits. This profit constraint
can be represented by equation (2):
Profits≤max 29:4%•Τοtal Capitalð Þ; 8:4%•TotalSalesð Þf g
ð2Þ
Note that the constraint implies a firm can earn up to a
29.4% return on capital. In a meta-analysis of cost estimatesMorgan et. al. [23] indicate that recent cost of capital
estimates for pharmaceutical firms are around 11%, in the
same range as the regulated rates of return for National
Energy Board regulated pipelines in Canada. This suggests
that the allowed rate of return under the PPRS is much
higher than would be necessary to fairly compensate firms.
Unlike the standard utilities application of the ROR
model described above, the PPRS does not include provi-
sions for periodic hearings to gather information on the cost
elements of regulated firms. Instead the PPRS imposes
pre-determined values for cost elements in its profit calcu-
lations. Fixed allocations are set for research and develop-
ment costs, marketing costs and information costs.
These cost allocations act as a cap on the costs that a
pharmaceutical firm can claim against its revenues when
calculating the revenue cap. Marketing and information
costs can only be claimed if incurred domestically
(i.e. - in the U.K.) while Research and Development allo-
cations are made for costs incurred domestically or abroad.
Allocations for marketing and information costs have a
pre-determined cap while research and development costs
are capped at a specific portion of the firm’s total sales.
The OFT report on the 2005–2009 PPRS acknowledges
that, by its very nature, cost-based regulation is set up
to reward inputs rather than outputs [33]. That is, a
low-value product produced at high cost will fetch a
higher regulated price than a high-value product produced
at a low cost, distorting firms’ investment choices [34].
In addition to reducing the costs of regulation and the
information required by the regulator, cost allocations
limit the regulated firm’s ability to over-report or inflate
costs, largely mitigating this issue.
The price cap and ROR models discussed focus on pro-
tecting consumers/payers by limiting the prices for drugs.
While a suitably chosen regulated fair rate of return should
be effective in maintaining an incentive for orphan drug de-
velopment, the implementation of the U.S. Orphan Drug
Act has demonstrated that regulated market exclusivity
plays a substantial role and may be essential in incentivising
development. Even though the U.S. case does not represent
a price control scheme we cannot ignore it in discussing
effective policies for orphan drugs pricing.
No price controls: U.S. Orphan Drug Act (ODA)
The U.S. ODA focuses primarily on creating incentives for
pharmaceutical firms to invest in orphan drugs develop-
ment. Prior to its introduction, development of drugs for
rare diseases was seen as unprofitable due to the large
fixed cost of development and small patient numbers as
discussed above. The ODA is focused on reducing or off-
setting R&D costs and increasing the expected revenues
associated with marketing an orphan drug [35].
To achieve the latter goal, the ODA stipulates a seven
year market exclusivity period for any orphan drug
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(FDA). During the period of exclusivity the FDA will
not approve another drug for the same indication without
consent of the “exclusive” drug’s manufacturer. A single
manufacturer may have one or more “exclusive” drugs
approved for a single indication, and any single drug
can have exclusivity for a number of indications, but
no two manufacturers can have exclusivity for a single
indication without consent of the originally approved
orphan drug’s manufacturer [35].
The EU enacted a set of similar policies in 2000 including
development subsidies, other financial and bureaucratic
benefits and a ten-year period of exclusivity for Orphan
Drugs [26]. While subsidies and other direct financial
benefits no doubt provide increased development incen-
tives this exclusivity period (7 year U.S. and 10 year E.U.)
is widely regarded as the most sought after incentive
introduced by the ODA and EU policies, consistent with
empirical evidence showing that potential competition
(prior to patent expiration) is the largest deterrent to
investment in a new drug [36].
The FDA approved only ten orphan disease treatments
prior to the establishment of the ODA and has approved
hundreds since [37] and the orphan drug market is now
growing faster than the conventional drug market.
However, the imposition of a seven-year exclusivity period
(while an integral part of the ODA’s incentive system)
without associated price controls creates an opportun-
ity to exercise market power that is challenging to all
insurers, state or private. The next section further details
how the ROR model as applied to utilities can be adapted
for orphan drug price control.
A rate of return model for orphan drug price regulation
Due to the defined small market for orphan drugs and
the related lack of suitable markets against which to
yardstick, direct yardsticking of orphan drugs prices is
likely infeasible. Applying a cost-effectiveness measure to
orphan drugs has also all but been ruled out as a sufficient
approach since orphan drugs are typically too costly. The
similarities in market and cost structures between orphan
drugs and utilities illustrated in section 2 indicate that
regulatory methods which have proven effective for
utilities have merit in application to orphan drugs. The
existing precedent under the U.K. PPRS of ROR style
profit controls is also encouraging despite the fact that
these controls have proven largely redundant.
As discussed, the risk structure of orphan drugs devel-
opment is more complex than a comparable undertaking
in a utility. As such, care must be taken in identifying an
appropriate regulated rate of return for orphan drugs
especially since the cost of capital associated with or-
phan drug development likely varies depending on the
stage of production.Since risk is a significant portion of the cost of capital
we would suggest that multiple rates of return be applied
to the firm’s sunk capital investment at different stages of
development. A high risk, high rate of return should be
applied to the sunk costs allocated for years prior to initial
regulatory approval. Following regulatory approval the rate
of return would then transition to lower level representing
the reduced ex-post risk following approval.
In effect, the initial high rate of return would be applied
retroactively to the pre-approval costs associated with
orphan drug R&D, thus essentially setting or modifying
the initial rate base for the application of rate of return.
As a basic example, assume that the firm is allocated a
pre-clinical cost C1 at time T1 and that the cost allocated to
conduct clinical trials C2 is incurred at time T2. Regulatory
approval occurs at time V such that V >T1 > T2. The initial
rate base would then be given by equation (3):
RateBaseð Þt¼V ¼ C1• 1þ rHð ÞV−T1 þ C2• 1þ rHð ÞV−T 2
ð3Þ
where rH is the high risk first stage rate of return. Following
regulatory approval, the effective revenue cap for an orphan
drug would then be calculated as in equation (4):
Revenue≤ RateBase‐AccumulatedDepreciationð Þ•rL½ 
þ OtherCosts½  þ DepreciationExpense½ 
ð4Þ
where rL is the low risk second stage rate of return. In this
formulation, the “Rate Base” would be a measure of sunk
costs (R&D). “Other Costs” refers to the continuing variable
costs incurred by the firm (i.e. - those costs associated with
marketing and actual production of the drug etc.). The last
term “Depreciation Expense” refers to the contribution
towards paying down the principle liability associated
with the allocated costs in the rate base. The depreciation
expense is discussed in more detail below.
The complex risk structure for orphan drugs implies
that cost allocations (like those employed under the PPRS
profit control scheme) are more appropriate than the “used
and useful criterion” (applied in utilities jurisdictions) when
determining costs. By their nature, R&D expenditures in
pharmaceutical jurisdictions are stochastic in productivity,
in contrast to sunk capital investments in utilities jurisdic-
tions. The use of fixed cost allocations rather than a formal
assessment of costs will also avoid the cost-padding issue
inherent in cost-based pricing mechanisms.
To appropriately set these cost allocations regulators/
insurers should commit to a periodic review of industry-
wide costs potentially punctuated by regular multi-party
cost hearings used to determine appropriate deemed costs
or cost caps. Deemed costs produced by these hearings
would be based on industry costs, including both big
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if not all of a firm’s incentives to minimize costs under rate
of return style regulation. Since the regulators and insurers
are not privy to detailed information on the cost structure
of orphan drug firms, the use of cost allocations based on a
broad industry overview represents both a desirable, and
potentially the most accurate feasible, mechanism to set
cost inclusions in the rate base. The cost allocations should
reflect the average cost to develop and bring to market a
new orphan drug, accounting comprehensively for the
risk of failure and the cost of capital. There is a lively
debate about the true costs of R&D [23,25]. We do not
attempt in this paper to describe exactly how to meas-
ure the average cost of drug development; this would be
the task of the cost hearings.
The depreciation expense would largely be dictated by
the size of the rate base at the time of approval and the
duration of exclusivity granted. The depreciation expense
needs to be set sufficiently high to ensure that the firm is
able to recoup the total value of its deemed sunk costs
(the total value of the rate base) prior to expected generic
entry [38]. There is a trade-off in setting the depreciation
expense and the period of exclusivity. A short exclusivity
period implies a high depreciation expense and high prices
with the benefit being an accelerated move to potential
generic competition. Conversely, a long exclusivity period
implies a low depreciation expense and low regulated
prices with the cost being a delayed move to potential
generic competition.
An insurer could calculate the amount it needed to
contribute to the revenue requirement on the basis of its
income share among OECD countries. Consider a simple
example of how this might work for the United Kingdom.
Suppose that it is found that the average new orphan drug
has capital costs of $1bn. The United Kingdom’s share of
this is approximately 5% (calculated as its share of OECD
GDP). So the average drug development cost attributable
to the UK is in the range of $50 m. Given 10 years of
exclusivity enabled by patent protection, this implies
that a firm would have to earn roughly $8 m per year
above its operating costs to recoup the UK share of the
average costs of development. If there were 200 patients
using the product in the UK, that would suggest that the
price per patient should allow for the assessed production
and distribution costs, plus an additional $40,000 to pay
for the pro rata R&D costs.
Formal regulatory hearings (in which firms, and interested
intervener groups file evidence and formal arguments)
would likely be effective in determining the appropriate
exclusivity period (and corresponding depreciation rate)
and cost allocations. In our estimation, such hearings
should also prove to be an efficient forum for the discussion
and determination of reasonable regulated rates of return.
Since the regulated rate of return should allow somecross-subsidization towards the costs of failed attempts,
it is necessary that firms and all other interested parties
be consulted to provide evidence supporting a formal
regulated rate of return. We would foresee this evidence
taking the form of statistical analysis on failed development
attempts and costs presented on behalf of the pharma-
ceutical firms and subject to substantial review by other
interested parties including patient groups and insurers.
Determining an effective risk premium in this manner is a
contentious subject in its own right, and the regulated rate
of return should represent a balance between the interests
of firms and their shareholders and those of insurers and
their patients. In any case, compared to an approach
with confidential pricing in the context of a product listing
agreement, this approach is more transparent and therefore
less likely to lead to free-riding by countries.
An important question is whether the model we
propose here would sustain the existing level of R&D
in orphan drugs. If the only effect of using a rate of return
calculation is to reduce expenditures, it is evident that it
would discourage R&D. However, most governments
deal with binding constraints in drug expenditures, and
increased spending on one product is likely to reduce
spending on another. A rate of return model could help
insurers to achieve a better, more predictable spread of
expenditures across products. That is, by reducing ex-
penditures on orphan drugs that are earning very high
rates of return, there would be more budget space for
other orphan drugs. In this case, there is no reduction
in expected revenues to support R&D, but a more even
allocation of revenues across products, reducing risks
for companies.
Conclusion
Current price comparisons and cost-effectiveness measures,
while adequate for pricing drugs for common diseases,
have proven problematic when applied to orphan drugs.
The attempts by firms to argue for high prices based
on high average costs, combined with the apparent
similarities between cost structures in the utilities sec-
tors and pharmaceutical production shows that a form
of cost based regulation should be effective in limiting
the prices paid for orphan drugs while still fairly com-
pensating firms.
As such, in cases where the insurer wishes to pay for a
drug that does not meet the cost-effectiveness standard,
we believe it is worth exploring the use of a rate of return
model of regulation with the following modifications,:
1. The use of deemed rather than directly observed
costs in calculating the rate base used under rate of
return regulation. Periodic industry-wide hearings
would be conducted at fixed intervals to review
these deemed costs.
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more indications following the precedent set under
the U.S. Orphan Drug Act. This exclusivity period
would be accompanied by an appropriate
depreciation expense in the cost calculations such
that the firm recoups its initial investment prior to
potential generic competition.
3. A multi-stage approach for the regulated rate of
return, with higher regulated rates of return for
costs incurred prior to regulatory approval
(reflecting the high risk of pre-approval investments)
and a lower rate of return in the period after regulatory
approval (reflecting the significantly reduced risk of
investment following initial approval).
While the implementation of any such system requires
more investigation to resolve specific practical issues, such
work is warranted given the success of the rate of return
model in application to utilities jurisdictions and the
identified issues with extending common pharmaceutical
price cap and yardstick methodologies to the case of
orphan drugs. It has been suggested that orphan drugs
markets could greatly benefit from additional transparency
in pricing mechanisms [8]. At the very least, even a loose
cost-based regulatory framework resembling the one we
outline above should greatly improve transparency and can
potentially benefit orphan drugs developers/manufacturers
as well as insurers and their patients.
This proposal does not link the “value” of a new drug
to its price; instead, price would be, in effect, a function
of the rarity of the disease or condition treated. The reason
for excluding value is that we are considering drugs with
unacceptable cost-effectiveness ratios, and which would be
more or less automatically excluded from insurance if the
only rule used were cost-effectiveness. Despite this, these
drugs are sometimes included in insurance formularies. But
if the insurer throws out cost-effectiveness as a tool, what
rule is left? Our proposal provides a principled way to de-
termine a reasonable price for orphan drugs that fail cost-
effectiveness tests, but offer compelling medical value.Competing interests
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